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The electricity network investment need (EUR 
420 billion by 2050 according to [1]), associated 
with ambitious renewables integration targets, 
requires to investigate hybrid architectures such 
as ‘offshore meshed grids’ (OMGs). OMGs are dual-
purpose infrastructure that combine the functions 
of offshore wind farm (OWF) connection and cross-
border interconnection and that span across multiple 
countries and actors, i.e. independent wind farms 
operators and national transmission system operators 
(TSOs) (Figure).
Offshore Meshed Grids to Address 
European Energy Targets 
OMG have gained a growing attention both from 
European institutions and utilities. The European 
Union (EU) actively supports several initiatives 
which contribute to shedding light on a large array 
of technical, institutional, administrative, legal and 
economic conditions for OMG development. In 2010, 
the North Seas Grid Initiative project was launched, 
followed by the PROMOTioN project and, more 
recently, the Baltic InteGrid project. Utilities are also 
engaging in hybrid projects such as the Kriegers 
Flak Combined Grid Solution project and the future 
Power Island hybrid project [2]. The Polish TSO, PSE 
S.A, announced a hybrid offshore grid solution will be 
considered if offshore wind development is higher than 
the 4 GW currently planned [3].
The main arguments for OMG are to connect more 
wind energy while supporting cross-border exchange 
of electricity, thus tackling the three pillars of the 
EU energy policy: RES penetration (sustainability), 
markets integration and system reliability [4]. At the 
power system level, OMGs optimise the use of the grid 
infrastructure. The dual-purpose characteristic of OMG 
increases the network’s utilisation factor as compared 
to a classical radial connection and thereby represents 
a strong economic argument for development. In 
addition, OMG would enable the development of large-
scale OWF located far away from shore and therefore 
would not interfere with public acceptability. However, 
in spite of the expected benefits, the uptake of OMG 
is slow and remains limited to a small amount of 
stakeholders. 
Past research concludes 
such situation results from 
unsuited legal and regulatory 
frameworks [5]–[10] and 
studies OMG development 
using technical-economic 
optimisation methods 
based on the assumption 
that regulatory barriers are 
removed [11]–[13]. Using 
the Baltic Sea basin as a case 
study, our study analytically 
reviews the main barriers 
to OMG development by 
combining legal dogmatics 
and regulatory economics 
and addresses how to remove 
them. Our main contribution 
is to propose a solution at the 
crossroad between the two 
disciplines. 
An Unsuited Legal Framework…
Within the legal perspective, difficulties arise from 
the lack of explicit definition for OMG [14]–[18]. 
In the EU electricity market law, the high-voltage 
power cables are basically differentiated according 
to the purpose and the operator of the cable: the 
cables considered as part of a transmission system 
operated by a TSO, and the connection lines and 
cables linking a connection point (production unit or 
a consumption place) to the network. The division 
of regulated assets and private assets vary between 
the national legal frameworks. Connection cables, 
if considered as unbundled assets by national legal 
frameworks, are the responsibility of OWF operators 
and follow the private investment decisions. 
Interconnectors are, if not exempted, regulated 
assets that must comply with the requirements of 
TSO unbundling. The costs of interconnectors are 
recovered mainly through national grid tariffs and 
by congestion incomes. 
The cables of OMG serving dual-purpose are 
currently not delineated. The dual-purpose nature of 
OMG and the multiplication of applicable rules due 
to the different co-existing national legal framework 
at the sea basin level affect inevitably actors’ legal 
and financial responsibilities and risks. Currently, 
the parties have no incentives, nor necessarily even 
possibility, to invest in dual-purpose cables [19].  
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… That Creates Regulatory Barriers 
and Prevents Investment
Because national legal frameworks and TSOs’ 
regulation are tightly embedded, regulatory economics 
gives the right conceptual framework to assess the 
repercussions of the lack of explicit definition. The 
poor harmonisation across national transmission grid 
tariffs and the different connection approaches for 
OWF are the two main factors that hinder coordinated 
investments in hybrid projects (see table). 
Different tariffs applied to a single infrastructure 
result in different behaviours from the stakeholders 
in response to: the tariff levels (what proportion of 
the tariff pay each category of grid user, consumer vs. 
generator); structures (what distribution between fixed 
and variable costs); and the presence of locational 
components. In the Baltic Sea countries, only the 
generators connected to the Nordic countries’ grid 
must pay a tariff, which substantially differs in its 
structure and cost components. When assessing the 
suitability of grid tariffs to promote OMGs, the tariffs’ 
interaction with the intermittency of the electricity 
generated by the wind farm is the key parameter to 
consider. Tariffs with a large share of fixed costs and 
using locational components are, ceteris paribus, riskier 
for OW operators to invest in as compared to simple 
energy-based tariff (for more details, see [20]). 
The way OWF’s connection costs are distributed 
between TSO and OWF operator defines who 
bears the investment risk and also directly affects 
the viability of the OW project (for a review of the 
different approaches and their implication see [21]). 
Launching an OMG initiative in the Baltic Sea without 
prior alignment in connection cost allocation and 
access tariff would inevitably result in distorting 
OWF investments, incentivising connection to the 
German, Polish or Danish grid, supposedly at the 
expense of economic and or environmental optimum. 
For wind energy experts [22], current regulatory 
frameworks increase investor’s perceptions of risk. 
At the TSO’s level, the multiplicity of cost distribution 
and recovery methods ultimately creates an uneven 
level playing field among TSOs and conflicts with the 
completion of a joint coordinated investment project. 
The entanglement of national interests on top of the 
investment landscape identified in [17], [19], adds 
another layer of difficulty before reaching a common 
agreement on the development of OMG.
Introducing an Independent Offshore TSO
Against this background, the introduction of an 
independent offshore TSO is investigated to circumvent 
and enable OMG. First, practically concentrating the 
grid investment decisions to one entity could solve 
problems relating to the allocation of costs between 
several TSOs and OWFs. Accordingly, the investment 
decisions could become more straightforward. Second, 
the suboptimal investment incentives for OWFs could 
at least partly be avoided as there would be a level 
playing field originating from the clear division of 
tasks between OWF operators and offshore TSO. In 
addition, regional approach instead of contradicting 
national interests could be easier to implement 
through one entity than by several entities involving 
in the projects. The introduction of a supra-national 
offshore TSO would require new legal definitions at the 
EU level – and harmonisation at some extent – and, for 
example, the question of offshore grid financing and 
implementation of right incentives should be solved in 
this context.
Discussion
The development of offshore meshed grids in 
Europe has taken its first steps almost a decade ago, 
but the progress is still hindered by regulatory and 
legal barriers. This article has focused on the main 
economic barriers for OMG construction in the Baltic 
Sea region and stressed out how limited harmonisation 
of the regulatory framework for transmission system 
connection cost distribution and cost recovery leads 
to sending uneven signals to market actors, therefore 
distorting investment decisions and to creating uneven 
levels of risk for TSOs at the regional scale. While 
some energy producers have advocated a shift of 
grid operation and capital investment activities to the 
market actors, involving more separated activities and 
a multiplication of stakeholders, we highlight the need 
for coordinated actions, pervading to OMG projects, 
conflicts with such tendency. According to our analysis, 
the introduction of an independent offshore TSO 
could address the identified problems in centralising 
development decisions while responding to a single 
regulatory framework. However, new questions also 
arise, mainly relating to the governance of this actor: 
the introduction of a supra-national TSO necessitates 
to design a legal framework to implement and monitor 
its functions, in respect with the EU law and national 
sovereignty.
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IAEE Student Chapter Leaders 
Meeting
With the aim of driving forward products and 
services IAEE offers for student members, the 
leaders of ten student chapters and IAEE’s student 
representative met in the course of the 41st 
International Conference in Groningen. 
One objective of the meeting was to increase 
awareness of each other’s events and to discuss 
possible collaboration between student chapters. 
Another important item on the agenda was a 
discussion about how IAEE could retain former 
students after their transition into professional life, 
which resulted in a list of ideas of better services for 
students and young professionals. Among those was 
the intention of building a mentoring program where 
seniors provide advice and knowledge to younger 
members. Furthermore, young professionals could 
benefit from networking opportunities (e.g. business 
cocktails) and the student chapter leaders agreed that 
IAEE’s job bank service should be improved including 
an increase in jobs offered.     
Last but not least, the recently established working 
paper series of USAEE and IAEE aims at   increasing the 
circulation, visibility, and impact of research within the 
IAEE community and could be of great interest for PhD 
students and young professionals.
To better point out services and events and to 
improve communication as a whole, IAEE is setting 
up a social media team which is currently looking for 
volunteers who are motivated to contribute.  
